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Abstract
How has YouTube evolved as a cultural and commercial infrastructure? What institutional forms
has it produced? The present article takes up these questions through a discussion of multichannel
networks (MCNs) and their role within the digital video system. MCNs are a new breed of
intermediary firm that link entrepreneurial YouTubers with the advertising, marketing and screen
production industries. This article considers the functions of MCNs vis-a`-vis the existing con-
stellation of screen industry professions, including talent agents, managers and media buyers, who
perform similar functions offline. Combining structural analysis of the MCN industry with an
assessment of its cultural impacts, I show how Google’s decision to open the YouTube back-end to
third-party intermediaries is subtly changing the digital video ecology.
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Hollywood believes in pixie dust. Silicon Valley believes in data.
Today’s entertainment has to be a combination of both.
(Larry Shapiro, Head of Talent at Fullscreen, cited in Spangler, 2014b)
It has been almost a decade since Google acquired YouTube from its founders, Chad Hurley, Steve
Chen and Jawed Karim. During this time, the site has changed profoundly, shedding the youthful
exuberance of its early years – the ‘broadcast yourself’ era – and morphing into a more structurally
complex, managed ecosystem designed to monetize both amateur and professional content.
YouTube’s cultural-economic logic has changed along the way. The early YouTube was
characterized by the promise of direct, DIY communication with a global audience, and its cor-
porate image was that of the upstart outsider. Today, YouTube is thoroughly mainstream.
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Its signature innovations – revenue sharing of video advertising, automated content ID and open
viewer metrics – have become the basis for a massive commercial ecosystem (Burgess, 2014;
Cunningham, 2012; Grainge and Johnson, 2015; Kim, 2012; Snickars and Vonderau, 2009). Every
surface of YouTube – display ads, overlays, comments, pop-ups and not least the mise-en-scene of
the videos – has been opened for business in one way or another. This process has involved not only
Google but a wide range of other actors, including advertising agencies, data analytics firms, digital
marketing companies and spambots, as well as hundreds of thousands of non-professional producers.
A significant but understudied aspect of this story is the emergence of multichannel networks,
otherwise known as MCNs, or more colloquially, as YouTube networks (for brevity I will use the
term MCN). MCNs are intermediary firms that operate in and around YouTube’s advertising
infrastructure. A common business model is for MCNs to sign up a large number of popular
channels to their network, then, using YouTube’s content management system, to sell advertising
and cross-promote their affiliated channels across this network, while also working with popular
YouTube celebrities to develop them into fully fledged video brands. Since 2009, several hundred
MCNs have started up across the United States (especially in Los Angeles), in major European
markets and in a number of other countries. These companies form part of a thickening layer of
management around YouTube stars. As well as having a commercial relationship with YouTube,
which works direct with popular creators via the Partner programme, many YouTubers now sign
contracts with MCNs to increase their audience and advertising income and agree to split their ad
revenue with the MCN accordingly. Likewise, top-tier celebrities (pop stars, actors and models)
often add an MCN to their existing team of artist representation, alongside their manager, agent,
label/studio partners, lawyer and so on.
MCNs are controversial. YouTube is full of warning videos about the dangers of signing up
with ‘networks’ that are accused of exploitative tactics such as in-perpetuity contracting and unfair
revenue splits. Several top YouTube producers have broken up with their MCNs in spectacular
fashion, notably Ray William Johnson (Your Favorite Martian) who railed against the ‘thuggish’
talent contracts of Maker Studios (Johnson, 2012). More generally, MCNs are criticized for their
explicitly commercial function within the hybrid cultural–commercial–expressive space of You-
Tube. As Morreale (2014: 126) argues, they are part and parcel of a wider process ‘in which the
productive potential of prosumption becomes channelled into consumption’.
There is no doubt that the rise of MCNs reflects the deepening commercialization of YouTube
and the wider logics of commodification that are integral to Web 2.0 (Andrejevic, 2009; Fuchs,
2014; van Dijck, 2013). Whilst I do not dispute this point, I would suggest that the task for critical
analysis at this stage of the game is to scrutinize specific logics of commercialization at work
within particular parts of that ecosystem, on the understanding that these are not monolithic in
their operation or effects. In other words, we need to look in more detail at the structures that
enable this commercialization and their consequences. In the case of MCNs, this involves asking
questions such as: What are the implications, both economic and cultural, of this new layer of
professional management around YouTube producers? And what does this mean for YouTube as a
cultural space? The present article addresses these questions by analysing the MCN as a new and
evolving institutional form and by assessing its impacts on YouTube’s diverse production cultures.
MCNs as intermediaries
One way to answer these questions is to take a comparative approach, exploring similarities and
differences between the MCN and other media professions. Much of the controversy aroundMCNs
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stems from their structural position as middlemen, removed from the creative work of video
production yet profiting from the attention and traffic generated by such videos. In this sense,
MCNs have something in common with existing professions, such as agents, brokers and dis-
tributors, which have attracted similar critiques in the past. In other words, the MCN can be
understood as a kind of intermediary.
The formerly niche field of media and cultural intermediaries research has grown in recent
years, attracting an eclectic mix of social scientists and cultural theorists. This approach is con-
cerned with understanding ‘those workers who come in-between creative artists and consumers’
and emphasizes how they provide ‘a point of connection or articulation between production and
consumption’ (Negus, 2002: 503). In other words, it is about the messy middle of media industries,
and how its organizational structures shape cultural worlds. Some of this literature comes from a
body of research on cultural intermediaries, a tradition with roots stretching back to Bourdieu
(1984) and Williams (1981), which has generated an ongoing discussion in cultural studies
(Hesmondhalgh, 2002; Negus, 2002; Smith Maguire and Matthews, 2014). Related research on
specific intermediary professions, such as marketing and distribution, can also be found within film
studies, popular music studies and media industry studies (e.g. Johnson et al., 2014; Negus, 1992,
1999; Wyatt, 1994) and in related social science disciplines (e.g. Hracs, 2013; Zafirau, 2008). An
overlapping body of work, with a different inflection, can be found in cultural economy research,
where scholars scrutinize the organizational logics of particular industries, especially advertising
(McFall, 2004; Nixon, 2002).
Together, this body of research gives some useful concepts to work with. One of the issues to
emerge is the productive nature of intermediary work, which feeds back into text and consumption
in surprising ways. More than behind-the-scenes technicians, intermediaries ‘serve as one of the
prime vehicles through which organizational priorities find their way into representational prac-
tices’ (Havens, 2014: 40). A related issue is how intermediaries complicate our understanding of
cultural production. As Paul Grainge and Cathy Johnson argue in Promotional Screen Industries
(2015) – a wide-ranging book about promotional screen professions, such as digital marketing and
design – these categorically slippery professions offer an opportunity to rethink settled binaries
between production and promotion, and between artists, technicians and ‘suits’.
From this perspective, MCNs are a curious phenomenon. On the one hand, they perform classic
intermediary roles in the digital video industry, such as selling advertising, management, repping
and promotion, and can thus be considered as a YouTube-specific counterpart to older inter-
mediary professions like ad agencies and talent agents. However, as we will see, MCNs are unlike
anything that media industry research has dealt with before. The automated and scalable nature of
their activities means that the MCN industry operates in radically different ways from other
intermediaries and without the regulatory frameworks that have grown around them. For these and
other reasons, MCNs represent an opportunity to revisit some elements of the theory base around
intermediaries and update it for the platform economy.
The construction of the MCN
The roots of the MCN phenomenon can be traced back to 2007, when Google began rolling out an
early version of what would become its Content ID system and interlocking content management
system. These two technologies together enabled third-partymanagement of advertising accounts as
well as automated removal of infringing content. This was part of Google’s larger policy to pro-
fessionalize YouTube by making it more advertiser friendly and removing some of its rough edges.
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Throughout this period, Google’s strategy was to work with external companies who could help it
manage the increasingly vast and chaotic space of YouTube. The role of these companies, which
Google designated multichannel networks, would be to aggregate ad sales across the platform,
increase the quality of uploaded videos, reduce intellectual property infringements and generally
make it a more appealing space for advertisers. Since then, hundreds of MCNs have rushed in,
signing up hundreds of thousands of YouTubers along the way.1 Today, there is an MCN for almost
every conceivable niche, includingmusic video (Vevo, AllDefDigital), cooking (Tastemade), dance
(DanceOn), beauty (StyleHaul), gaming (Machinima), Latino culture (MiTu) and even lacrosse
(The Lacrosse Network). The largest of these, such as Maker and Fullscreen, typically represents
tens of thousands of channels each.
MCNs have received a lot of hype over the last few years, attracting the attention of journalists,
bloggers, the trade press, Silicon Valley heavyweights and venture capitalists. In 2012, a bidding
war over MCNs began. Over the next 2 years, major media companies took strategic stakes in
various MCNs or acquired them outright to enhance their digital divisions. The most widely
reported of these acquisitions was Disney’s purchase of Maker in 2014 as part of a deal valued
between US$500–$950 million.2 In other high-profile deals, DreamWorks took a stake in Awe-
somenessTV, and Warner bought a slice of Machinima. For the studios, having an MCN division
gave them an opportunity to develop ‘an in-house incubator to understand how to navigate
YouTube’ (Wallenstein, 2014). As the former Disney CFO Jay Rasulo remarked at the time:
The interest of our business units to get snackable forms of content out there is like 50 years ago when
movies studios were trying to make television – it’s not completely natural. . . . So it made sense to
acquire a company that is very good at this. (Rasulo, 2014: 5)
While the MCN gold rush has eased, there is still a lot of hype and speculation. Specialist
investment funds – such as Luminari Capital, which specializes in digital video – have emerged to
advise investors in this unfamiliar market. The list of corporate investors in MCNs is ever-growing
and includes not only established media and advertising companies (WPP, Singtel, Comcast
Ventures, Shine Group, Bertelsmann, Canal Plus and ProSeibenSat 1) but also venture capital
firms (Lakestar, Northgate Capital and Mitt Romney’s Bain Capital) and celebrities (Jon Landau
and Robert Downey) (Spangler, 2014a).
There is now significant diversity in the MCN landscape. Some MCNs specialize in ad
aggregation whilst others lean more towards talent development, original production or licensing.
Some are staffed by former entertainment agents, whilst others are run by digital marketing types
from outside the screen world.3 Some embrace the ‘MCN’ label, whilst others prefer to describe
themselves in different terms – as multimedia companies, studios or ‘many-to-many programming
services’. Whilst the largest companies, such as Maker and Machinima, have a client list that runs
into the tens of thousands, other MCNs work with a smaller group of creators. What most MCNs
have in common, however, is the basic model of providing non-professional creators with tech-
nical, promotional and advertising services in exchange for a commission (20–50% of net
advertising revenues) – a classic intermediary function.
MCN business models
Looking across the MCN landscape, we can begin to construct a loose typology of companies.
Many of the largest MCNs are now starting to resemble the traditional talent management com-
panies of Hollywood, rebooted for the digital economy. In terms of their operation, they devote
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significant resources to developing a top tier of talent with a 360-degree service – including
promotion and cross-promotion, product placement, IP management and data analytics – whilst
passively representing a much larger pool of hopefuls though their automated ad placement
service. The last few years have seen MCNs engage in all kinds of experiments to monetize
their clients’ content. One trajectory has been to branch out from channel aggregation and focus
on talent development. This involves facilitating deals with legacy media (cable TV appear-
ances, book deals and record contracts) to push their most promising YouTubers up the value
chain and make them stars in the offline world. Other MCNs are developing lines of mer-
chandise and running live tours.4 This kind of one-on-one attention is typically reserved for the
most popular YouTube celebrities. The rest just get the basic, automated ad aggregation and
revenue-share service.
As an example, the Los Angeles-based MCN Fullscreen (now owned by AT&T and The
Chernin Group) claims to represent more than 50,000 YouTube channels, though in most cases it
has no personal contact with these clients. Instead, it builds back-end tools that its creators can use
to do things like manage IP, create thumbnails and source stock footage. As its network grows,
Fullscreen can – in theory at least – continue to expand its channel and revenue base at marginal
cost. This is the MCN model at its most automated, scaled and impersonal. Similarly, Machinima
uses a gamified level-of-service model (M-White, M-Red and M-Black), with increasing levels of
pampering depending on the creator’s popularity and the agreed commission level.
A second trend among MCNs is to work with popular YouTubers to develop branded content,
typically in the form of product placement, integration and themed videos around consumer
brands. The aim here is to secure high-value consumer engagement as well as eyeballs, in ways that
embed brand messages deeply within videos (think of the cooking vlogger who tells you howmuch
they love a particular brand of olive oil, or sponsored reviews of particular cosmetic brands). This
model, essentially an update on old-fashioned product placement, is more lucrative than display
advertising because MCNs do not have to split their gross revenues with Google:
When you look at our valuation, I think it’s interesting that people haven’t talked more about how the
business models of the MCN landscape are so different. That continues to be ignored. When you talk
about our model, half of our revenue is not Google-media driven. It’s from branded entertainment. So
when you look at the value of revenue, all parts are not created equal. Yes, media revenue [i.e. money
from pre-roll ads] is extremely important. But half our business is non-Google dependent, and that’s a
more valuable revenue source. (Stephanie Horbaczewski, founder of the fashion MCN Style Haul,
cited in Shields, 2014)
The MCN as a firm has not emerged organically but has been actively constructed and defined
by Google, which controls the back-end systems. So we should not make the mistake of assuming
that the MCN industry represents the extent of artist management and ad aggregation activity on
the YouTube platform, as a wide range of other business models exists. For example, Los Angeles-
based Jukin Media specializes in selling broadcast rights to YouTube clips – mostly animal and
‘fail’ videos – which are used by cable channels and networks as padding for news and entertain-
ment programmes. Described as ‘a 5-year-old entertainment company whose staff scours YouTube
for videos the company can buy from creators before they take the Internet by storm’ (Shamout,
2014), Jukin also packages their clips together into Funniest Home Videos-style programmes that
are licensed as ready-made shows.5 There are also companies that perform MCN-like tasks but
operate outside the Google CMS. As an example, Ronaldo Lemos (2014) has written about the
phenomenon of entrepreneurial YouTube users from poor areas of Brazil creating their own
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YouTube networks and selling ads off unauthorized uploads and playlists of local dance music by
popular DJs and MCs, thus creating an informal advertising and cross-promotion network. Lemos’
analysis gives a vivid sense of the substratum of commercial activity that goes on beneath the
MCNs and outside the official YouTube back end.
These intermediaries are all different yet structurally similar in that they perform classic
gatekeeper functions whilst also creating new formal and informal markets around uploaded
content. Their common logic is to aggregate content, charge a levy for access to a prized pro-
motional space and provide assistance with technical production and distribution tasks. So we
should see them as part of a continuum of commercial intermediation in and around YouTube, one
that is likely to become even thicker as the platform evolves.
How new are MCNs?
It is tempting to see the MCN as a wholly new and disruptive phenomenon – a creature of venture
capital, platform surveillance and big data; a futuristic firm structure sent by the Internet to shake
up the way the entertainment business runs. But if we look closely at MCNs, we find that many of
the tasks they perform are actually extensions of existing media work. Indeed, rather than per-
forming brand-new functions, MCNs remediate the already-existing work done by media buyers,
ad agencies, agents, managers and A&R staff. Most of their signature functions are adaptations of
these roles (see Table 1).
Seen from this perspective, the distinctive feature of the MCN is not that it represents a radically
new profession but that it remixes and repackages roles into novel combinations. So there is
continuity here as well as change.
What makes the MCN such a strange beast, however, is that it performs all these tasks outside
the structures associated with older media professions, structures which to some extent mitigate
the conflicts that arise in entertainment industries. This is a point taken up recently by the television
scholar Denise Mann. In an article published in the journal Media Industries, Mann describes the
MCN landscape as the ‘unregulated, wild wild digital West’ – a ‘para-industry’ that has grown
rapidly in the absence of a formal industrial structure:
In the still-unregulated space of the new economy, Google (part of what Jennifer Holt dubbed the
‘access of evil’) has motivated purportedly maker-friendly companies like Maker Studios to bilk their
creative partners out of their share of what has become the new economy equivalent of Monopoly
money – AdSense dollars. (citing Holt, 2010; Mann, 2014)
Mann’s frontier metaphor is apt: The digital video scene is certainly wild and conflict-ridden,
reminiscent of previous moments where new markets emerge, attracting an influx of entrepreneur-
ial types. Characteristic of the early years of a medium – as in early cinema, radio and the printing
press – these are times when everything seems up for grabs, the rules have yet to be laid down and
the future of the medium can take many different forms. Analytically, this situation lends itself to
what Rick Altman (2004) has dubbed crisis historiography, or the study of industries in flux,
characterized by contestation and conflict among stakeholders with diverging interests, designs
and imaginations of what a particular technology could become.
But if past experience is any guide, the ‘Wild West’ moment will not last forever. In the last few
years, the MCN landscape has become very crowded, with a few key players established and some
successful business models starting to emerge, and others falling by the wayside. It may be that we
are moving to a second phase of the MCN story – reminiscent of the dynamics identified by
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Cunningham and Silver (2013) in their study of the digital video-on-demand market (fragmen-
tation followed by shake-out and maturity). Hence, it is interesting to consider how the MCN para-
industry (Mann, 2014) – as an organizational structure for intermediary work in digital cultural
industries – may evolve in the future and what kind of shape it may take.
I see two key variables in play here. The first is industrial consolidation – the degree to which
the rowdy landscape of small and large MCNs may settle down into a smaller, more stable cluster
of established firms linked to the major studios. This is already starting to happen, as we have seen
with the recent wave of acquisitions and cross-investments; however, we need to remember that
the extent of this consolidation will be limited because YouTube as a market is constantly
expanding and the start-up costs for networks are so low. The second issue to consider, as raised by
Mann, is regulation: how relations between MCNs, producers and the YouTube platform are
variously managed, and to what effect. As we will see, the regulatory issues are particularly
complex and deserve special consideration.
Regulatory dilemmas
The regulation of digital intermediaries is a fraught issue. From eBay and Amazon to Uber and
AirBnb, the Internet has produced a succession of disruptive platforms that bring with them
complex public policy issues and regulatory priorities, from tax to public safety, and which are
being carefully managed and scrutinized not only by public authorities but also – arguably more
effectively – by users and online communities. It is this combination between bottom-up and top-
down methods, and between state regulation, co-regulation and self-regulation, which char-
acterizes the situation of digital intermediaries (Lobato and Thomas, 2015: 116–138). As an
automated, global platform, YouTube sits uncomfortably between this paradigm of digital gov-
ernance and the old-fashioned world of entertainment contract law. From this perspective, the
characteristic regulatory dramas concerning MCNs – namely contractual disputes over payments
and intellectual property – are a curious mix of old and new.
Let’s begin by noting that the MCN industry, whilst certainly unruly, is not entirely ungoverned.
First, MCNs are subject to the labour and contract laws of the territories in which they operate.
Whilst no major legal cases involving MCNs have emerged yet, it is likely we will see these come
up soon and that they will provide precedent for future disputes. Second, MCNs are regulated by
Google’s internal systems, which are constantly tweaked to keep things running smoothly – as in
2013 when Google introduced automated systems to let creators dump their MCNs and reclaim
control over their advertising accounts (Marshall, 2013). This is the ‘code is law’ paradigm
(Lessig, 1999), in which Google, through its platform design as well as its voluminous support
Table 1. Intermediary functions performed by MCNs.
Specific function Typically performed by
Aggregating audiences for ad spends Media buyer
Content aggregation, marketing and packaging Distributor/television network/studio
Procurement and repping Agent
Long-term career development Manager
Finding new talent and franchises A&R
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material, forums and so on, creates systems designed to anticipate and defray potential conflicts
between its various stakeholders. Some of these Google-specific regulatory systems have been
remarkably successful. For example, the ostensible transparency of YouTube revenue-share
accounting – with its detailed viewer metrics and revenue data updated in real time – has elimi-
nated the tortuous contractual conflicts over gross and net that characterize screen industry
accounting. Revenue sharing is seen by all concerned to be straightforward, transparent and safe.
As Jeff Ulin (2013: 445) writes, ‘because of the detailed metrics there is implicit trust in the
system, and the accuracy (even arguably veracity) of the revenue splits’.
MCNs, in their dealings with prospective YouTube channel partners, emphasize ease of use and
simplicity. The process of signing up with an MCN bears little resemblance to the process of
signing up with an agent or manager. It is more like signing up to a social network, with a click-
through Terms of Service agreement. Nonetheless, it is a contractual relationship. But the
boundaries and nature of this relationship may be unfamiliar and opaque, a problem noted in recent
scholarship on end user license agreements and similar online contract systems (de Zwart, 2010).
At issue here is the aforementioned characteristic of MCNs to blur boundaries between existing
intermediary occupations by providing an automated service that does a bit of everything (see
Table 1). In other words, it is an issue of industrial convergence – not just between technologies
and platforms but also between professional norms and regulatory structures. This situation is
inherently conflictual. Because MCNs, in their basic ad aggregation function, are products of the
YouTube platform and could not exist without it, it makes sense that they have developed their
own ways of working that are specific to this platform and conform to its industrial logic. But as
YouTube continues to expand its channel base, and as YouTube celebrities go on to develop cross-
media personalities, the YouTube-specific arrangements between producers and MCNs start to rub
up against the industrial expectations and norms of the world outside, which has different ways of
doing things. Hence, the MCN gets dragged into the legal structures of analogue entertainment –
and its status as a ‘360-degree service’ becomes problematic.
Industrial convergence in context
One way to contextualize these issues of industrial convergence and role confusion among
intermediaries is to consider how such roles have been defined, at a regulatory level, and how they
have evolved as organizational structures. The case of talent agents is instructive here. In his book
Hidden Talent: The Emergence of Hollywood Agents, Tom Kemper (2010) vividly describes the
birth of the modern agent. As Kemper notes, whilst agents existed long before the movie industry,
stretching back at least to vaudeville days, the agent as we now know it was born in the early studio
period as talent markets began to organize around the studio structure. One of the changes to occur
during this period was the increasing demand for third-party intermediaries to represent artists in
their negotiations with studios. ‘As the film industry became concentrated in Hollywood studios,
with integrated distribution firms demanding steady product from the production divisions’, writes
Kemper, ‘talent agents stepped in to serve business functions that had become overlooked during
the expansions of the studios’ (Kemper, 2010: 5).
The early years of the Hollywood agent were marked by the same kinds of controversies that we
are now seeing with MCNs. In Kemper’s (2009: 7) account, these ‘early battles about agents’
power in the 1930s represent industrial growing pains as the various components of the business
struggled to establish places for themselves within the expansion and stabilization of the business’.
Contract disputes, often involving the biggest stars of the day, were reportedly widely in movie
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magazines and trade press and typically centred on claims of exploitation and conflict of interest.
As these stories circulated, desire for regulation of this problematic quasi-profession increased, in a
way that is not dissimilar to what is happening now with MCNs. Over time the agent business
became subject to layers of law and regulation – labour laws (state and federal), industry codes of
practice (including academy regulations) and a registration system (Zelenski, 2003). Their overall
effect was to more precisely define the acceptable function of the agent and to distinguish it from
the role of producers/studios and managers, by specifying the kinds of work each profession should
do and, in the case of agents and managers, the levels of commission that each should receive. The
formerly chaotic business of artist representation – once a Wild West profession – became for-
malized through regulation.
One consequence of all this was a structural division between two previously overlapping
professions: the agent and the manager. Agents (‘ten percenters’) required a license to operate,
had fixed commission structures and a defined scope of work, limited mostly to procurement of
employment and contract negotiation. Managers on the other hand focused on long-term talent
development and were barred from procurement (though not from producing their own movies).
Hence, the business models diverged: agents needed a large book of clients whilst managers
worked intensively with a few. This structure has blurred significantly in recent years, as the rise
of ‘packaging’ complicates once more the distinction between agents, producers and managers,
with major agencies like Creative Artists Agency also acting as producers and packagers of
major motion pictures. Yet, the distinction endures as a basic structure underlying Hollywood as
well as the industries of other nations that have evolved along similar lines. In Australia, for
example, a similar mix of formal law, licensing requirements and guild-level regulations defines
the role of the agent and differentiates it from other intermediaries. Similar structures can be
found in other nations.
The case of agents is one small example, and each intermediary has a unique history and story to
tell. But it raises comparative questions of relevance to the MCN case. To what extent might the
future development of MCNs follow these familiar patterns of formalization? Or will it look
completely different?
The specificity of the MCN
There are structural similarities between MCNs and agents: both professions were born during a
period of wild industry growth and turbulence and both were characterized by high-profile con-
flicts around artist exploitation, leading to community demands for regulation. But there are
important differences, suggesting a distinct pattern of evolution.
The most obvious of these is digital technology. The automated and uniquely scalable nature of
most MCN activities allows a much greater scale of artist representation than ever before. Whilst a
hard-working agent may be able to manage a hundred or so clients, one MCN staffed by a handful
of people can represent tens of thousands. This automation eliminates the personality-driven
conflicts associated with the movie industry, whilst introducing new potential spaces of conflict –
such as the algorithms underlying YouTube’s ad placement systems.
One promise of the MCN is that it will make its creators stand out in YouTube’s ocean of
content by making their videos appealing to YouTube’s algorithms. With this aim in mind, MCNs
are developing systems to manage automated cross-promotions across their channels; to offer
advice on titles, keywords and metadata and to associate content with topical and frequently
searched-for terms. In this sense, the MCN is a search-optimization service tailored for YouTube.
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But the entry of these third-party specialists into the YouTube ecology creates an arms race for
technical expertise. Like political spin doctors or ‘payola’ radio promoters (Dannen, 1991), MCNs
perform valuable services for their clients whilst also diluting trust in the overall system of which
they are a part. YouTube algorithms become seen as something requiring specialist expertise to
manage and ‘game’, leading to greater scrutiny of these algorithms, and reduced confidence in the
accessibility of the overall system for YouTubers without MCN contracts.
There is an emerging spatial dimension to these conflicts. In the offline entertainment indus-
tries, disputes between agent intermediaries and the talent they represent are adjudicated through
the courts based on where the talent, rather than the agent, resides. In the case of Hollywood, this is
straightforward as stakeholders are in the same city. But the geography of YouTube – where
Los Angeles-based MCNs represent Swedish gamers and Mexican beauty bloggers, and European
MCNs represent diasporic producers living outside the European Union – is fundamentally
different.6 The automated nature of MCN business, and its demand for scale, means that these
companies regularly sign up creators far outside their national borders. Indeed, the MCN’s scope of
activity is determined much more by language-market boundaries than national borders. As
YouTube intermediaries multiply, we may start to see the localized contract disputes associated
with show business start to play out transnationally, in a way that has few precedents in enter-
tainment history.
Conclusion: The MCN’s cultural consequences
This article has analysed a structural shift within the YouTube ecosystem. As we have seen,
Google’s decision to open up the YouTube advertising back end to third-party intermediaries has
subtly changed the economy of online video: it has added another layer of intermediation between
top-tier producers and their audiences; it has entrenched entrepreneurial calculation as a cultural
norm across the platform and it has further exposed YouTube’s producer community to a range of
digital economy discourses and expectations. Whilst these changes are not immediately visible to
the end user of YouTube, who is unlikely to know or care what an MCN is, they are important
because they are subtly recalibrating the way the digital video economy works.
In the preceding discussion, I have focused mostly on structural issues, but let me conclude with
some speculative arguments about what the MCN might mean for YouTube as a textual space. As
we have seen, MCNs – with their dedicated production studios and ‘free’ online tools for creators –
are part of Google’s drive to make YouTube more like TV by raising the aesthetic standards of
videos and making the whole user experience more uniform and pleasant. As a rule, MCN
involvement is likely to drive professionalization of YouTube video production and distribution,
leading to the mix of ‘pixie dust’ and ‘data’ envisaged by Larry Shapiro in this article’s opening
quote. But the point to emphasize is that this professionalization will be unevenly distributed.
MCNs are not interested in all of YouTube; they are only interested in popular channels that
align with specific consumer ‘verticals’ (e.g. fashion, cooking and tech review channels, with
their abundant possibilities for pre-roll advertising and product placement, and their clear link to
specific advertising markets and demographics). In time, the presence of MCNs is likely to mean
that producers working in these verticals may professionalize at a faster rate than in other parts of
YouTube, driven in part by the resources made available by MCNs. In other words, the rise of
MCNs may start to have a visible effect on the generic make-up of the YouTube archive, by
stimulating the production of certain kinds of content over others, and making some kinds of
content ‘better looking’ than others. Producers of beauty, cooking, gamer and fashion videos will
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be increasingly targeted by MCNs because of the clear link to consumer markets. Producers of
local history and bird-watching videos will probably not receive the same attention. So we can
expect to see a changing ratio of professional and amateur production on YouTube and changing
aesthetic standards associated with each. This will have differentiated effects across the You-
Tube landscape.
As noted at the start of this article, YouTube scholarship has undergone a shift away from its
foundational discourses of participatory culture towards a more ambivalent evaluation of the
hybrid cultural–commercial space that YouTube became at the end of the last decade, following
the Google acquisition. With the entry of MCNs, we are perhaps entering a third phase. YouTube is
now a managed platform co-governed by intermediaries. This has an associated subjectivity,
grounded in the vision of the platform as an ecology of professional services as well as production;
a space that requires not just talent and popularity but also third-party expertise as a prerequisite to
success. In its 10-year transition from a paradigm of broadcast yourself to ‘sign up with an agent’,
YouTube reminds us that disruptive technologies bring not only new production cultures and
audience experiences but also the inevitable possibilities for commercial intermediation in the
messy middle. MCNs form part of this layer of intermediation, one that tends to thicken in all
distribution systems in times of market expansion. In this sense, the MCN reminds us that the
history of media is not just a history of creative producers but also, inevitably and especially,
a history of middlemen.
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Notes
1. To get a sense of the major multichannel networks (MCNs) see SocialBlade’s list of the top 100 YouTube
networks, available at http://socialblade.com/youtube/top/networks.
2. The initial deal was for US$500 million, but with performance-related top-ups that could push the final
figure significantly higher.
3. An example from the first category is the former Creative Artists Agency agent Larry Shapiro, who has had
executive roles with multichannel networks (MCNs) including Fullscreen and AwesomenessTV/Big
Frame. But many MCN staff appear to be from outside the Hollywood establishment.
4. An example is FullScreen’s Idol-like InTour events, run in conjunction with the organizers of Warped
Tour, and featuring Fullscreen’s roster of young male YouTube celebrities. Aimed at young girls, the
InTour 2014 event promises an opportunity to ‘see all your fave baes slay a day filled with music, games,
comedy and more’. Its tagline: ‘Offline. Out Loud’.
5. Jukin’s model is to purchase videos outright from creators, usually paying a flat fee of a few hundred or a
few thousand dollars, or on a revenue-share basis.
6. For example, MiTu is Los Angeles based but works with creators from across the Spanish-speaking world,
while the German MCN Studio 71 has signed up German-speaking talent in the United States.
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